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NOTES

PARENTAL RIGHT TO WITHDRAW CONSENT IN ADOPTION
PROCEEDINGS

Introduction
Public interest has often been aroused by parents objecting to
the adoption of their child, particularly when the child has been living
in a foster home for a period of time. Sometimes the child has been
living in the foster home because of his parents' default; at other
times he has been placed there for adoption with the consent of his
parents. When to allow this consent to be revoked has been a problem for as long as adoption has been permitted.
Adoption, a modern innovation of statute,' is the permanent substitution, as parent, of one or two persons for the natural parents of
a child.2 All states require judicial proceedings in order to effectuate
an adoption.3 Legally, its effect is three-fold:
(1) the rights of the natural parent concerning the child are
completely cut off,4 with corresponding severance of parental
responsibility; 5
(2) the parental rights and responsibilities are assumed by the
foster-parent;-6-

(3) the child's duties to the natural parent are transferred to
the foster parent.7
Before adoption may be effected, however, it is imperative to determine whether the parents' consent is necessary inasmuch as adoption
takes away legally recognized parental rights.
' Adoption was not recognized at common law and is strictly statutory in

nature. See Matter of Thorne, 155 N.Y. 140, 143, 49 N.E. 661, 662 (1898).
The first common-law jurisdiction to pass a statute legalizing adoption was
Massachusetts, in 1851. See Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243, 262 (1880). New
York enacted its first adoption statute in 1873. Laws of N.Y. 1873, c. 830.
England did not authorize adoption until 1926. Adoption Of Children Act,
1926, 16 & 17 Gzo. 5, c. 29.
2 See LEAvY, THE LAW oF ADopnoN 65 (2d ed. 1954); IV VEmmR,
FAMIY LAwS § 261 (1936).
AmRCAN
3
E.g., N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 110. See also IV VERNIER, op. cit. supra
note 2 §257; cf. Middleworth v. Ordway, 191 N.Y. 404, 84 N.E. 291 (1908).
4 See LEFAVY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 65; IV VERNmR, op. cit. supra note 2,

§ 261.

GFor a tabular summary of state laws concerning the criminal liability of
parents for juvenile delinquency, see LuDwiG, YoUTH AND THE LAw 153-67
(1955).
For a resume of statutes relating to civil liability for support, see
IV VERNmR, op. cit. supra note 2, § 234.
6 See LEAvY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 65; IV VERNiR, op. cit. supra note 2,

§261.

7 See IV VRNim, AmERICAN FAmY LAWS §§ 235, 261 (1936).
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Bases for Requiring Parental Consent to Adoption
That there are parental rights is implied or express in the law;
however, neither statute nor opinion in New York or elsewhere definitively lists them. One right that is generally recognized is that of
a parent to the services and earnings of his child; 8 another is that of
custody. 9 The former is probably a holdover from the common law,
which gave a father an almost proprietary interest in his children.' 0
Notwithstanding its general recognition this parental right is not
usually considered in adoption proceedings, perhaps because it is only
a consequence of custody. The legal right to custody, more pertinent
here, should be based upon the parents' moral duty and right to educate children.' 1 Thus, whether the legal right to custody is absolute
or not should depend upon whether the moral duty and right to educate are absolute. This duty is primarily in the parents as opposed
to the state.' 2 However, government has the duty to protect the interests of a child when parents are found wanting either physically
or morally, whether by default, incapacity or misconduct, in their
duty.'3 Thus the parental right is subject to administrative supervision by the state and is, therefore, not absolute. Hence, the legal
right to custody, which flows from the moral right and duty to
educate, 14 is not an absolute right.
Consent of the natural parents to an adoption is necessary from
a moral standpoint because adoption takes away the natural and legal
right of custody. Perhaps in recognition of this, the statutes of every
American jurisdiction require the consent of both natural parents to
adoption under ordinary circumstances. 15 Logically, when the parent
defaults in the performance of the duty which is the basis of his right,
his consent may be dispensed with. Accordingly, the normally requisite parental consent is often deemed unnecessary when the parent
8 See IV VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 7, § 232. Morally, a parent does not
have an unqualified right to all the child's earnings. Cf. 2 Corinthians 12:14.
9See IV VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 7, § 232.

10 IV id. §§ 231, 232.

11 "Parents are under a grave obligation to see to the religious and moral
education of their children, as well as to their physical and civic training, as
far as they can, and moreover to provide for their temporal well-being."
CODE OF CANON LAW, Can. 1113. See Encyclical, Pope Pius XI, On Christian
Education Of Youth, translated in FIm GREAT ENCYCLICALS 37, 45, 46 (1939) ;

Ryan, Philosophy Of Marriage And The Family, in

MARRIAGE AND FAMILY

42, 55 (1950).
12 See Encyclical, Pope Pius XI, supra note 11, at 46.
23 Id.at 49.
14 See Fischer v. Meader, 95 N.J. 59, 111 AtI. 503 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
15 E.g., N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 111(2) ; see IV VERNIER, AMERIcAN FAMILY
LAWS § 259 (1936) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 72.14 (Supp. 1954) ; MD. CODE ANN.
art. 16, § 82 (Flack, 1951) ; S.C. CODE tit. 15, § 15-1382 (Supp. 1955) ; TENN.
CODE ANN. § 9572.21 (Williams, Supp. 1952).
RELATIONSHIPS
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is insane,16 or has abandoned the child, 1 7 or is the father of an illegitimate child,18 or no longer has the legal custody of a child. 19 In the
last instance though, the consent of the person or agency having legal
custody of the child is necessary.20
Parental Right to Revoke Consent
Having once given the requisite consent, what right does a
parent have to withdraw that consent? A parent may or may not
have an absolute right to revoke, given different jurisdictions and
varying certain factors. Moreover the decisions are sometimes
guided by emotion, 2 ' rather than sound reasoning. New York courts
have been particularly perplexed by this problem,22 and have been
unable to formulate a general rule to govern revocation cases.
The situation occasionally arises where a party to an adoption
experiences a change of heart after a final order has been issued.
Ordinarily this order cannot be reopened. However, some states
permit abrogation of the adoption under certain circumstances. For
example, New York allows abrogation on the condition that all of
the parties concerned consent thereto. 23 In addition, a final order
16 See, e.g., People ex rel. Strohsahl v. Strohsahl, 221 App. Div. 86, 222 N.Y.
Supp. 319 (1st Dep't 1927); N.Y. Dom. R.. LAW § 111; Note, Due Process
Rights Of Mentally Ill Parents In Nonconsensual Adoptions, 30 IxD. L.J. 431
(1955).
'7E.g., N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 111; see also IV VERNIER, op. cit. supra note
15, § 259.
IsSee, e.g., Matter of Hardenbergh, 144 Misc. 248, 258 N.Y. Supp. 651
(Surr. Ct. 1932); State ex rel. "A" v. A Licensed Or Chartered Child-Placing
Agency, 194 Tenn. 400, 250 S.W.2d 776 (1952) ; N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 111(3).
19 See, e.g., Matter of Magee, 52 N.W.2d 99 (S.D. 1952); N.Y. DoM. REL.
LAW § 111(4). Although in New York the consent of a parent divorced for
adultery is not required, notice of the proposed adoption must be given him.
Id. § 111. This statute has sometimes been interpreted as giving the divorced
parent a right to prevent the adoption. See, e.g., Caruso v. Caruso, 175 Misc.
290, 23 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Matter of Norris, 157 Misc. 333,
283 N.Y. Supp. 513 (Surr. Ct. 1935). But see Matter of Bress, 191 Misc.
930, 77 N.Y.S.2d 852 (County Ct. 1948).
20 See, e.g., People ex rel. Marabottini v. Farr, 186 Misc. 811, 33 N.Y.S.2d
600 (Sup. Ct. 1942) ; cf. Matter of Santacose, 271 App. Div. 11, 61 N.Y.S.2d 1
(4th Dep't 1946); People ex rel. Our Lady of Victory Infant Home v. Venniro,
126 Misc. 135, 212 N.Y. Supp. 741 (Sup. Ct 1925); N.Y. DoM. Pia. LAW
§ 111(4).
21 See, e.g., Matter of Kane, 91 Ohio App. 327, 108 N.E.2d 176 (1952)
(where the court found inspiration for its decision in two sentimental pictures
of mother and child which hung in its library).
22 See cases cited notes 38, 43, 45 infra.
23 N.Y. Dom. REm. LAW § 116, Matter of McDevitt, 176 App. Div.-418,
162 N.Y. Supp. 1032 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 221 N.Y. 598, 117 N.E. 1076 (1917).
See also IV VERNnm, AmERicAN FAMrLy LAWS § 264 (1936) ; 28 ST. JOHN'S
L. RaV. 111 (1953). But cf. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 118 (provides that a foster
parent who has adopted a child from an authorized agency may petition for
abrogation if the child is guilty of wilful desertion, a misdemeanor, or ill-
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may be set aside if it was obtained by fraud, 24 or if some element
essential to its validity is lacking.2 5 More frequently, the situation
arises where the natural parent seeks to revoke after consent has
been given, but before a final order has been decreed. In determining whether a parent may revoke before the final order, the fulfillment of statutory requirements often overrides principles of contract
law which might be applicable in other situations. Thus, if the consent is not in statutory form, it may be withdrawn. 26 Again, the
27
consent of a minor parent may not be avoided by a plea of infancy.
In addition, the right to revoke is personal and may not be exercised
by anyone other than the party who originally consented.2 8 Even
though a non-statutory consent or a contract to consent has been
acted upon by the adopting parents, estoppdl is not available to bar
a consenting party's attempted revocation. 29 Specific performance
will not lie; 3 however, there may be a cause of action for damages
under certain circumstances.31 On the other hand, contract principles are not entirely disregarded. For example, when the consent
is obtained through fraud or duress, or when the parent is not made
aware of the true import of the agreement, there has been no meeting
82
of the minds and thus the consent is voidable.
behavior, and that the court may allow the abrogation if the interests of foster

parent and child so require), Matter of Souers, 135 Misc. 521, 238 N.Y. Supp.

738 (Surr. Ct 1930) (where abrogation was granted over agency's objection).

24 Stevens v. Halstead, 181 App. Div. 198, 168 N.Y. Supp. 142 (2d Dep't
1917) ; N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 114.
25 Murphy v. Brooks, 120 Misc. 704, 199 N.Y. Supp. 660 (Sup. Ct. 1923);
Matter of Gallegos, 21 Ariz. 250, 187 Pac. 573 (1920); cf. Oeth v. Erwin,
6 Ill. App.2d 18, 126 N.E.2d 526 (1955).
26 Foley v. Carnesi, 123 Colo. 533, 232 P.2d 186 (1951) ; see People ex rel.
Catholic Charities v. Hagstotz, 117 N.Y.S.2d 818 (Sup. Ct 1952).
27 In re Adoption Of A Minor, 144 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1944) ; Matter of
Presler, 171 Misc. 559, 13 N.Y.S.2d 49 (Sup. Ct. 1939). But see Matter of
Harvey, 375 Pa. 1, 99 A.2d 276 (1953).
28 Cf. Matter of Oddo, 186 Misc. 359, 59 N.Y.S.2d 612 (Surr. Ct. 1946).
29
Keheley v. Koonce, 85 Ga. App. 893, 70 S.E.2d 522, 527 (1952) (dictum);
accord, Matter of Paden, 181 Misc. 1025, 43 N.Y.S.2d 305 (Surr. Ct. 1943).
Contra, Matter of Adoption of D, 252 P2d 223 (Utah 1953).
30 Bardorf v. Rebecca Talbot-Perkins Adoption Soc'y, Inc., 240 App. Div.
275, 269 N.Y. Supp. 794 (2t Dep't 1934). However, that part of a contract
to adopt which provides that the child shall be made an heir of the adopting
party will be specifically enforced. Gavin v. Aitken, 258 N.Y. 595, 180 N.E. 348
(1932) (memorandum opinion); Middleworth v. Ordway, 191 N.Y. 404, 84 N.E.
291 (1908) ; Ansley v. Ansley, 154 Ga. 357, 114 S.E. 182 (1922) (memorandum
opinion).
31 See Bardorf v. Rebecca Talbot-Perkins Adoption Soc'y, Inc., spra note
30; Matter of Nelms, 153 Wash. 242, 279 Pac. 748, 749 (1929).
32 See, e.g., Matter of Kropp, 279 App. Div. 934, 111 N.Y.S.2d 767 (2d
Dep't 1952) [no opinion, but facts are stated in People ex rel. Kropp v. Shepsky,
305 N.Y. 465, 467, 113 N.E.2d 801, 802 (1953)]; Matter of Anonymous, 195
Misc. 6, 88 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Surr. Ct. 1949) ; People ex rel. Flannagan v. Riggio,
193 Misc. 930, 85 N.Y.S.2d 534 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
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When there is no problem regarding formal statutory requirements, and the parent attempts revocation, the fundamental issue of
whether the right to revoke is absolute or conditional is reached.
Formerly, the rule in the majority of jurisdictions was that the right
to revoke consent before a final order was absolute and could be exercised arbitrarily. 33 In recent years, however, the trend has been
otherwise, and the majority rule now is that the right is limited, and
that its exercise is conditioned upon a consideration of its effect on
all the parties.3 4 Some states deny the absolute right of revocation
on the ground that the parent is powerless to deprive the court of
jurisdiction once it has been acquired.3 5 Diametrically opposed to
this stand is the extreme position of Michigan. There, a parent may
withdraw consent during the period in which the court has power
to grant a rehearing after a final order has been decreed. 36 In New
York, although there is a recent decision 37 in line with the now prevailing view, the problem cannot be considered settled because the
Court of Appeals has never decided
the issue and there are conflict38
ing opinions in the lower courts.
The amount of time that a child has spent in the adopting home
has been determinative, in some cases, of whether the right to revoke
is absolute or conditional. The statutes of most jurisdictions require
that the child be in the adopting home for a minimum period of time
before a final order of adoption will be decreed.3 9 In New York this
period is six months. 40 The time requirement may be waived in the
discretion of the court hearing the petition, 41 but if there is an abuse
of discretion the decree is invalid. 42 The significance of the required
33Annot., 138 A.L.R. 1038 (1942). See, e.g., Matter of White, 300 Mich.
378, 1 N.W.2d 579 (1942); Fitts v. Carpenter, 124 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939) ; Matter of Nelms, 153 Wash. 242, 279 Pac. 748 (1929).
34 Bailey v. Mars, 138 Conn. 593, 87 A.2d 388, 392 (1952) (dictum) ; Annot.,
156 A.L.R. 1011 (1945). See, e.g., In re Adoption Of A Minor, 144 F.2d 644
(D.C. Cir. 1944) ; Keheley v. Koonce, 85 Ga. App. 893, 70 S.E.2d 522 (1952) ;
Matter of Cannon, 53 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1952) ; Ex parte Schultz, 64 Nev. 264
181 P.2d 585 (1947).
35 Bailey v. Mars, supra note 34 at 391 (dictum); see, e.g., Graham v.
Francis, 83 Colo. 346, 265 Pac. 690 (1928) ; Wyness v. Crowley, 292 Mass. 461,
198 N.E. 758 (1935).
36 See Matter of White, snpra note 33.
37 Matter of Anonymous, 143 N.Y.S.2d 90 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1955).
38 Compare People ex rel. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 195 Misc. 1054,
91 N.Y.S.2d 591 (Sup. Ct. 1949), and Matter of Burke, 60 N.Y.S.2d 421
(Surr. Ct. 1946) (allowing an absolute right of revocation), wTith People ex rel.
Grament v. Free Synagogue Child Adoption Comm., 194 Misc. 332, 85 N.Y.S.2d
541 (Sup. Ct. 1949), and People ex rel. Harris v. Commissioner, 188 Misc. 919,
70 N.Y.S.2d 389 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (denying an absolute right).
39 See LE.vy, THE LAW OF ADno oN 60-63 (2d ed. 1954).
40 N.Y. Doi. REL. LAW § 112(7).
42 Ibid.
42 Matter of Bruce, 269 App. Div. 791, 53 N.Y.S.2d 502 (3d Dep't 1945),
aff'd, 295 N.Y. 702, 65 N.E.2d 336 (1946).
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waiting period is not clear. In one case a surrogate indicated that
the law gave a parent an absolute right to revoke, 43 and allowed a
mother to revoke because she ".
rogative within six months.. . . ,,44

.

. exercised her statutory pre-

On the other hand, the court in
People ex rel. Harris v. Commissioner45 stated that the statutory
provision for a minimum waiting period ".

.

. does not make the

natural parent's surrender of the child conditional or subject to revocation within six months . . . [and that a consent] is not revocable

. . . merely because the parent has experienced a change of mind or
heart." 4 The legislative history of the New York statute does not
indicate that the minimum period was established to provide the
natural parent with a locus poenitentiae, but rather that " '.

opportunity ... be offered to learn if
able in all respects. " 47 Apparently
vide both a trial period for the child
the court to investigate the proposed

.

. full

the proposed adoption is desirthen, the purpose was to proin the new
home and time for
adoption. 48

Exploitation of Adoption
Adoption, like all other matters involving humans, is subject to
exploitation by the unscrupulous. For example, in recent years
newspaper headlines have denounced "black market" adoptions, i.e.,
transactions where a third party, for a profit, encourages a parent to
part with the custody of his child. Although this practice is not
widespread, 49 it illustrates the danger of racketeering, even in family
affairs. Moreover, parents themselves may try to profit financially
43 Matter of Burke, 60 N.Y.S.2d 421 (Surr. Ct. 1946).
44

Id. at 423 (emphasis added).

45 188 Misc. 919, 70 N.Y.S.2d 389 (Sup. Ct. 1947).

at 922, 70 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
for Appellants, p. 21, Matter of Anonymous, 143 N.Y.S.2d 90
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 1955).
48 The issue of abandonment has been interjected into many adoption cases.
The adopting parents have sometimes sought to thwart a withdrawal of consent
461d.

47 Brief

by claiming that the natural parent had abandoned the child by signing a consent
to adoption. Although there is some opinion to the contrary, consent to adoption does not of itself constitute abandonment. Matter of a Minor, 178 Misc.
142, 33 N.Y.S.2d 793 (Surr. Ct. 1942) ; Matter of Harvey, 375 Pa. 1, 99 A2d
276 (1953). Contra, Matter of Anonymous, 198 Misc. 185, 189, 101 N.Y.S.2d
93, 97 (County Ct. 1950) (dictum). Because consent of an abandoning parent
is not necessary, the adoption process has often commenced without parental
approval. In determining whether to allow the parent to terminate the abandonment and thus make parental consent necessary, the "statutory prerogative"
approach has been used to permit the parent to recover the child if efforts to
do so were made within the "trial" period. See, e.g., Matter of Cohen, 155
Misc. 202, 279 N.Y. Supp. 427 (Surr. Ct. 1935). Conversely, adoption has
been allowed when a mother's efforts were not "seasonable." See, e.g., Matter
of Anonymous, 80 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Surr. Ct. 1947); Matter of Davison, 44
N.Y.S.2d 763 (Surr. Ct. 1943).
49 See Comment, 59 YALE LJ. 715 (1950).
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from the adoption of their children. They may do this by contracting
with prospective foster parents for a sum of money in exchange for
their consent in the first instance, or by threatening, after the foster
parents have custody of the child, to withdraw consent unless financial demands are met. To combat this prostitution of adoption, the
New York Legislature has made it a crime to request, receive or give
money in connection with the adoption of a child. 0 In addition, some
courts have been alert to this danger. 51 For example, in In re Adoption Of A Minor,52 the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
stated that "[i]t is inconceivable that Congress . . . could possibly
* . * have contemplated unrestricted withdrawal of consent without
cause or reason of any kind," 53 and further that" [a] premium would
... be put upon the emotional instability which produces illegitimates;
to say nothing of the possibilities for racketeering which such an interpretation of the law would put in reach of those who may be criminal
in their tendencies as well as lacking in the qualities of parenthood." 54
A recent New York case, Matter of Anonymous, 55 strikingly
demonstrates the possibility of extortion if a parent were to have an
unlimited power of revocation. In that case an unmarried mother
executed a written consent to the adoption of her infant and delivered
the baby to the prospective foster parents. Later, when the petition
for adoption was filed, the mother acknowledged the agreement in
court. She was examined by the surrogate who found that the consent was freely and deliberately given. Subsequently, according to
the foster parents, she threatened to take her baby back unless she
was paid $1,000. The district attorney, acting upon the complaint of
the foster father, monitored telephone conversations between the natural and foster parents. After the natural mother was questioned by
the district attorney's office concerning the conversations, which were
clearly open to the interpretation that money was demanded as the
price of continued consent, she moved before the surrogate to revoke
her consent. He refused to hear evidence of the attempted extortion
and permitted revocation. The Appellate Division unanimously reversed, holding that the mother had no absolute right to withdraw
consent. The court declared that consent is conditionally revocable,
that is, it may be withdrawn only in the discretion of the surrogate.
It further stated that evidence of the violation of the Penal Law was
5o N.Y. PENAL LAW § 487-a. Authorized child-placing organizations are
exempted from this sanction. Id. §487-a(1). However, the adopting parent
may pay reasonable and actual medical and hospital fees for services rendered

in connection With the birth of the child to be adopted. Id. § 487-a (4).
51 See, e.g., People ex rel. Hydock v. Greenberg, 273 App. Div. 710, 712,
79 N.Y.S.2d 389, 392 (1st Dep't 1948) ; Matter of Anonymous, 198 Misc. 185,
188, 101 N.Y.S.2d 93, 96 (County Ct. 1950).
52 144 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
5
3 Id. at 648.
54 Id.
5

at 650.
143 N.Y.S2d 90 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1955).
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admissible; that proof of illegality or immorality of purpose would
require denial of revocation.
Conclusion
The right of revocation should be conditional in order to protect
the interests of all parties involved. As in cases involving only the
custody of a child,5 6 the primary consideration in adoption proceedings
should be the child's welfare, because that is the basis of the moral
duty to educate and the legal right to custody. The importance to a
child of stability in home life is well recognized.57 Deleterious effects
might result from taking a child out of a foster home to which he
had become accustomed, and in which he may have lived for years.
At the same time, however, consideration must be given both to the
natural parents and to the foster parents. Natural parents should be
given the opportunity to discharge properly the great duty, imposed
upon them by natural law, to rear their children. Although they may
be excused under certain circumstances, this responsibility cannot be
shifted merely by placing a child in the care of strangers. 58 Parents
must, insofar as possible, secure the child's adoption in some good
family. 59 Therefore, they have a real interest in the child after placement, but before final adoption. Should they feel that the prognosis
for the child's integration into the adopting family unit, or for his
welfare, is poor, they should be given the opportunity to object to final
adoption. Also, the circumstances of the natural parents may have
greatly changed after their consent; this should be weighed against
any changes that may have occurred in the foster home. The foster
parents may have made financial outlays, or changed their mode or
place of living in contemplation of the addition of the child to their
family. Certainly a real though intangible factor which should be considered is the affection which the foster parents may have developed
for the child. Public policy is also involved. Disregard for the interests of foster parents may tend to discourage worthy individuals
from attempting to adopt a child.
The opinion in Matter of Anonymous 6 0 is broad enough to comprehend the foregoing considerations. It is hoped that the ruling
there, that revocation may only be exercised in the trial court's discretion, will become firmly established, by legislation or by judicial
opinion, as the law in New York.
56 See, e.g., People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 271 N.Y. 285, 287, 2 N.E.2d
660, 661 (1936) ; People ex rel. Johnson v. Erbert, 17 Abb. Pr. 395, 400 (N.Y.
Gen. T. 1st Dist. 1864).
57 See, e.g., Matter of Bock, 280 N.Y. 349, 353, 21 N.E.2d 186, 187 (1939);
v. Convent of Sisters of Mercy, 200 Misc. 115, 119, 104 N.Y.S.2d
Mary I939, 943 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
58 H NoLNiN AND SCHMITr, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE MORALIS 271, 278 (27th
ed. 1951).
59 Id. at 278.
ro 143 N.Y.S.2d 90 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1955).

